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TF81

LEVEL 2

OP RAHBARI

DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)

OBJ BURNHAM

7 DAY APPROVAL



OP TYPE:

DDO

START OF MISSION:

21 AUG 10 (On trigger)

END OF MISSION:

22 AUG 10

TGT:

B1: OBJ BURNHAM (RTAF 2307)

(ABDUL KALTA)

B2:

OBJ NOVA / **PSR(S)1** (RTAF 2306)
(NEMATULLAH)

JPEL:

YES

JPEL LIMITATIONS:

NIL

TAO:

TALAWE BERFAK DISTRICT

BAGHLAN PROVINCE

42S VD 23036 91463

CRU Commander

GIROA APPROVAL:

MOI PROSECUTOR/COMD

PSR(IC)4

RC CONCURRENCE:

PSR(IC)4

(Approved 16 Aug)

RC Commander

Conditions: LO to TOC, Soft Knock, KLE
engagement

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JUSTIFICATION FOR NIGHT RAID: It is most appropriate to conduct this operation in the hours of darkness:

1. IN ORDER TO MINIMISE THE POTENTIAL FOR CIVCAS

PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

Assessment that night raid lessens risk to civilians because civilians likely indoors/less risk of combat

2. IN ORDER TO MINIMISE THE THREAT

PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

Assessment that night raid conditions lessen risk of large-scale insurgent response

3. IN ORDER TO SUCCESSFULLY DETAIN ABDUL KALTA (OBJ BURNHAM).

PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

Assessment that night raid conditions likely to favour successful detention

4. MITIGATION – BATTLESPACE HANDOVER

PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

Assessment of positive security impact in area of operation; contingency planning; planning for steps following operation, including for property damage and civilian casualties

5. MITIGATION – CRU (TF81 APU)

PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

Steps taken to mitigate adverse reaction to operation, including significant involvement by Afghan forces and public information

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OBJ BURNHAM

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NIGHT RAID CRITERIA		STATUS	COMMENT
1) ANSF should be included in all night raids. When this is not feasible, the CONOP or storyboard must highlight their absence, and provide justification for unilateral action.			ANSF personnel will be participating in this task.
2) A representative from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (e.g. ANA, ANP, NDS) should be notified prior to commencement of the operation.			MOI has approved the use of CRU
3) ANSF should be the first force to make contact – they should be the first force seen and the first voices heard by the occupants of any compound entered.			ANSF will participate in the prosecution of OBJ BURNHAM .

PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

Listing of remaining classified Night Raid Directive criteria and explanation as to how operation will be in compliance with them

PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

Risk assessment. The following is a summary of this document taken from a U.S Department of Defence report '*Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*.'

Level 0 (Low Risk)

- Day-time deliberate pre-planned forced entry required (progressive 'soft-knock' and 'hard knock'
- Political consequences offer minimum potential of prejudicial IO, media or political impact.

Level 1 (Medium Risk)

- Operations involving entry into houses or compounds at night to include deliberate pre-planned forced entry required (progressive 'soft knock' and 'hard knock'
- May have minor to moderate unfavorable regional media impact, detrimental IO and/or undesirable political consequences, manageable at the regional level.

Level 2 (High risk)

- pre-planned kinetic operations within 10km within 1km of border with Pakistan or Iran
- SOF conducting deliberate operations with company size force or greater within 1km border with Pakistan, or 10km of border with Iran
- Arrest, apprehension, or detainment of any current or prominent former Afghan Government appointed official
- Potential for collateral damage, unfavorable media impact, severely detrimental IO, and/or undesirable political consequences at the national level.



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
OP RAHBARI

OBJ BURNHAM

DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)

LEVEL 2

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OP RAHBARI
DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)

OBJ BURNHAM

LEVEL 2

7 DAY APPROVAL



INTEL SUMMARY SHEET

FUNCTION:

Abdul KALTA is a TB Sub Commander under PSR(sen)1 1.2.7 - Tala Wa Barfak District, Baghlan. Suspected that he directs and conducts attacks in Bamyān AO, AI.

SIGNIFICANCE:

Abdul KALTA is a TB Sub Commander who leads attacks on CF and is involved in TB insurgent activity in Bamyān Province and Bamyān Area of Influence .

EXPECTATION:

PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

Explanation of wider military effects of
Kalta's removal

RISK:

Abdul KALTA has no known links to political or media organizations. Decisive IO needs to be conducted and explained to village elders in the NE Bamyān and SW Baghlan to thwart negative IO messages from INS.

INTEL GAIN/LOSS:

PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

Explanation of the type of knowledge Kalta had and relative impact of
not obtaining this information if he is killed

THREAT STATEMENT:

Abdul KALTA is assessed to have small arms and possibly IED's. He is likely to command 15-20 TB fighters in his village; at this time it is not known how many MAM's are inside his compound, the chance of SA attack is assessed as MEDIUM during the period of darkness and HIGH during daylight hours. HUMINT reports indicate that the Tirigan Village also operates a night guard force conducting armed roving patrols.

ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE:

24 total reports: all from Humint, from 11 separate sources, 11 which are graded C3 and above.

NO	INTEL TYPE	SOURCE REF	GRADE	DATE OF REPORT	DETAIL	FLAG
1	HUMINT	12	B3	10 AUG 10	ABDUL KALTA IMPLICATED IN THE ATTACK ON NZPRT PATROL, KARIMAK 3 AUGUST 2010	A
2	HUMINT	8	C3	9 AUG 10	ABDUL KALTA LED THE PART ATTACK ON 03 AUGUST 2010 NEAR KARIMAK VILLAGE	B
3	HUMINT	2	C3	8 AUG 10	ABDUL KALTA NAMED AS ONE OF THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK ON NZPRT PATROL, KARIMAK 3 AUGUST 2010	C
4	HUMINT	8	C3	5 AUG 10	ABDUL KALTA (COMMANDER ABDULLAH QALTA) PLANNED AND LED THE ATTACK ON NZPRT PATROL, KARIMAK 3 AUGUST 2010	D
5	HUMINT	3	B2	4 AUG 10	ABDUL KALTA (COMMANDER ABDULLAH) AND OTHERS INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK ON NZPRT PATROL, KARIMAK 3 AUGUST 2010	E
6	HUMINT	8	C3	3 AUG 10	ABDUL KALTA (COMMANDER ABDULLAH QALTA) PLANS THE ATTACK ON NZPRT PATROL, KARIMAK 3 AUGUST 2010	F

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OP RAHBARI

DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)

OBJ BURNHAM

LEVEL 2

7 DAY APPROVAL



FUNCTION:

Maulawi NEMATULLAH is a TB Sub Commander under Mullah Abdul Hakim 1.2.7 - Tala Wa Barfak District, Baghlan. Suspected that he directs and conducts attacks in Bamyan AO, AI.

SIGNIFICANCE:

Maulawi NEMATULLAH is a TB Sub Commander who leads attacks on CF and is involved in TB insurgent activity in Bamyan Province and Bamyan Area of Influence.

EXPECTATION:

PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

Explanation of wider military effects of Nematullah's removal

RISK:

Maulawi NEMATULLAH has no known links to political or media organizations. Decisive IO needs to be conducted and explained to village elders in the NE Bamyan and SW Baghlan to thwart negative IO messages from INS.

INTEL GAIN/LOSS:

PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

Explanation of the type of knowledge Kalita had and relative impact of not obtaining this information if he is killed

THREAT STATEMENT:

Maulawi NEMATULLAH is assessed to have small arms and possibly IED's. He is likely to command 15-20 TB fighters; at this time it is not known how many MAM's are inside his compound, the chance of SA attack is assessed as HIGH by day and MEDIUM by night. HUMINT reports indicate that the Tirigan Village also operates a night guard force conducting armed roving patrols.

ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE:

44 total reports: all from Humint, from 23 separate sources, 18 which are graded C3 and above. J2 Assessment: The balance of reliable HUMINT, within which multiple sources corroborate information, indicates that this intel is reliable and forms an accurate portrayal of the target's activities, links and intent.

NO	INTEL TYPE	SOURCE REF	GRADE	DATE OF REPORT	DETAIL	FLAG
1	HUMINT	23	C4	10AUG10	MAULAWI NEMATULLAH IMPLICATED IN THE ATTACK ON NZPRT PATROL, KARIMAK 3 AUGUST 2010	A
2	HUMINT	12	C3	9AUG10	MAULAWI NEMATULLAH IMPLICATED WITH THE ON THE NZPRT CONVOY ON 03 AUGUST 2010 NEAR KARIMAK VILLAGE	B
3	HUMINT	5	C3	8AUG10	MAULAWI NEMATULLAH IS INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK ON NZPRT PATROL, KARIMAK 3 AUGUST 2010	C
4	HUMINT	23	C4	10AUG10	MAULAWI NEMATULLAH IMPLICATED IN THE ATTACK ON NZPRT PATROL, KARIMAK 3 AUGUST 2010	D
5	HUMINT	20	B2	4AUG10	MAULAWI NEMATULLAH AND OTHERS INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK ON NZPRT PATROL, KARIMAK 3 AUGUST 2010	E

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



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OP RAHBARI
DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)

OBJ BURNHAM
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MOE	SOFT KNOCK (GRADUATED RESPONSE AS REQUIRED)	
LEGAD CONCURRENCE	CONCUR – 15 Aug 10	
RC CONCURRENCE	CONCUR – 16 AUG	
ROE FOR ISAF FORCES	PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3	PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3
AFGHAN LAW FOR AFG FORCES	MCI PROSECUTOR APPROVED WARRANT FOR ARREST	
POL ON COI 's (HRS / TYPE)	24hrs	PSR(S)2, PS /ISR
PID (FAM / W / C)	4 x MAMS @ COI 3	Nii Nii

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OP RAHBARI

OBJ BURNHAM

DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)

LEVEL 2

7 DAY APPROVAL



Who: TF81

PSR(S1), PSR(S2), FSN

CRU

What: DDO

Where: TALAWE BERFAK DISTRICT, BAGHLAN PROVINCE

(A1 - 42SVD2303691463, A2 - 42SVD2307591473, A3 - 42SVD2309291151)

When: ON TRIGGER. (POD 21 - 22 AUG 10)

Why: DISRUPT INS NETWORK ELEMENTS PLANNING ATTACKS ON ANSF / COALITION FORCES AND LOCAL POPULATION AND ENHANCE THE AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY OF GIROA.

INTENT:

DISRUPT INS NETWORKS AND LEADERSHIP, DETAIN POI, PREVENT ATTACKS AGAINST ANSF / COALITION FORCES AND LOCAL POPULATION AND ENHANCE THE AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY OF GIROA WHILST ENABLING MOI TO SERVE ARREST WARRANT AND ENFORCE GIROA LAW.

METHOD:

HUMINT TRIGGER, **PSR(S1), PSR(S2), PSR(S3)**

HAF INFIL BY NIGHT OF ASSAULT GP, C2 AND OVER WATCH POSITIONS. ISOLATE THE COI PRIOR TO ASSAULT FORCE CLEARING COI AND DETAINING POI. RAPID TSE WILL BE CONDUCTED PRIOR TO BACKLOADING DETAINED POI AND MOVING ONTO SUBSEQUENT OBJ. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR PROSECUTION OF SUBSEQUENT OBJ REMAINS THE SAME AS PREVIOUS OBJ. EXFIL WILL BE BY HELO.

ENDSTATE:

OBJ BURNHAM DETAINED, TSE COMPLETE, TU RECOVERED TO CW AND **PSR(S1), F** HQ, **CRU** INTACT AND POSTURED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

SCHEME OF MANOEUVRE:

PRELIMS: CONFIRM POI IN BDL. STAGE **CRU** TO CW

PHASE 1: MOVE TO OBJ A1 AND A2. CORDON AND CONTAIN.

PHASE 2: DETAIN POI AT A1 AND A2.


PHASE 3: DETAIN POI AT A3

PHASE 4: TSE AND BSHO

PHASE 5: RTU KABUL

SUMMARY OF EXECUTION:

ON RECEIVING CONFIRMATORY INTEL, THE TU WILL STAGE FROM CW AND DEPLOY TO THE TARGET AREA IN ORDER TO CONTAIN AND ISOLATE COI AND CLEAR IOT DETAIN POI. COI WILL BE SEARCHED AND ITEMS OF INTEREST EXPLOITED. MAMS WILL BE DETAINED BY **CRU** TRANSPORTED TO MOI HOLDING FACILITIES FOR DETAINMENT PROCESSING. TU WILL CONDUCT BSHO PRIOR TO EXFIL TO KABUL.





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DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)

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SOM / ACTION ON TARGET

INSERTION:

Insertion will be conducted from CW by Helo with simultaneous insertion of HAF and Overwatch posns. HLZ will be secured by blocking force who will orientate N down the valley. **PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**, while ISR and AC-130 will be over target.

ACTION ON TARGET:



Aslt Force will move by foot to TIGARAN 1 and TIGARAN 2. POI 1 will be detained and exploitation conducted. Aslt Force will then move to TIGARAN 3, repeating process. Throughout operation overwatch position will provide cover and overwatch as required. Detainees will be processed by **CRU** and COI exploited. Aslt force will wdr back to HLZ where blocking force is providing security.

EXFIL:

HAF exfil will occur sequentially from HLZ with overwatch providing cover throughout, before being withdrawn themselves. AWT will remain on station with ISR to provide over watch throughout exfil to KABUL. All detained Bravos will be processed by MOI on return to KABUL.

LOCATION(S):

A1 - 42SVD2303691463, A2 - 42SVD2307591473,
A3 - 42SVD2309291151



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DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)

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Medical Treatment:

Level 1: Buddy aid and 3x Adv Medics at CCP. TF 81 allocated primary medic to assign CCP, direct CASEVAC/MEDEVAC related duties and oversees triage. MEDEVAC platform stabilization en route and MASCAL contingency.
Level 2: Resuscitative /stabilisation & Surgical Capability at ISAF Role 2 / 3 (BAF Role 3 / KAIA Role 3 / PEK Role 2).
Level 3: BAF R3

Evacuation:


Primary: MEDEVAC (AIR) to BAF R3.
Alternate: MEDEVAC (AIR) to KAIA R3.
Secondary Alternate: MEDEVAC (AIR) to PEK R2.

* Determined by RC-E MEDEVAC (based on injury/conditions/asset availability etc.)

COMMS PLAN: PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

MEDEVAC PLAN:
P: Treat on site, Air MEDEVAC BAF (R3)
A: Treat on site, Air MEDEVAC KAIA (R3)
SA: Treat on site, Air MEDEVAC PEK (R2)

MTF	PRI/ALT	LOC	TOTAL DIST	FLT TIME
BAF R3	PRI	OBJ	260 KM	113 MINS(AIR)
KAIA R3	ALT	OBJ	260 KM	113 MINS (AIR)
PEK R2	SEC ALT	OBJ	276 KM	118 MINS (AIR)
BAM R1 STAB POST	PRI ALT SEC ALT	OBJ	50 KM	30 MINS (AIR) RETURN





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DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)

LEVEL 2

OBJ BURNHAM

7 DAY APPROVAL



KARZAI'S 12

CONDITION	STATUS	COMMENT
1) Gain COMISAF approval before arrest, apprehension, or detainment of a current or former government appointed official		Green: Not a government official Red: Pending COMISAF Approval for gov't official; or CG approval for District official
2) Conduct coordination with local government officials and tribal leaders when conducting searches		Green: Coordination conducted with village / District / Province leadership Red: Coordination not conducted (any co-ordination likely to lead to compromise)
3) Ensure the return of materials / documents taken during searches, unless the owner is detained and the property becomes evidence		Green: Material not required for exploitation will be returned Red: All material will be retained until further disposition
4) Ensure personnel receive training on local customs and courtesies prior to conducting authorized searches		Green: All soldiers on mission trained Red: Deficiency / soldiers not trained
5) Ensure soldiers conducting searches ask for doors to be Opened by occupants rather than soldiers forcing entry		Green: Leaders / ANSF / GOA will ask occupants to Open doors (Soft Knock) Red: Will not ask to Open doors; a hard-knock is required
6) Avoid the cuffing or binding of hands, unless required for security		Green: Target will not be bound unless a threat to CF Red: All targets will be bound
7) During low risk Operations, use a local person to enter the home or business of the person to be searched to explain what is happening		Green: Locals / ANSF / GOA will enter all buildings first (dependant on threat assessment) Red: CF will enter first (dependant on threat assessment)
8) Conduct of night searches		Green: No night search (dependant on target threat assessment) Red: Night Search (dependant on target threat assessment)
9) Ensure there is an infusion of reconstruction funds to areas where local people were detained and subsequently released		Green: Planned CMO follow-up and/or CERP Funds will be utilized in area Red: No planned CMO / CERP follow-through will be spent in area (Dependent on BSO post Op)
10) Sustain the use of interpreters for direct interpretation while conducting raid or detaining GOA personnel		Green: Interpreters will be used for entire mission Red: No interpreters
11) Deliberate Capture or Offensive Operation		Green: Not a deliberate Capture or Offensive Operation Red: Is a deliberate Capture or Offensive Operation
12) Operating within 10km of the IRAN or PAKISTAN border.		Green: Operating more than 10km from the IRAN or PAKISTAN Border. Red: Operating within 10km of the IRAN or PAKISTAN BORDER (COM SOF Approval Req)

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OP RAHBARI

OBJ BURNHAM


DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)

LEVEL 2

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TASK ORG



PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

COMMAND & CONTROL

UNIT	LOCAL	REGIONAL
CRU		, GDPSU
TF81	TF 81 TOC, CW	COM ISAF SOF
MOI PROSECUTOR	CONFIRMED PRIOR TO OP	PSR(arm)1, PSR(IC4)

ANSF INVOLVEMENT

TOTAL NUMBER OF ANSF:	x (CRU), MOI		
Planning	H	M	L
Preparation	H	M	L
Execution	H	M	L
Post Op Assessment	H	M	L

EXTERNAL SUPPORT

	ORG	NTM	DIS	RESPONSE TIME
QRF	BAF QRF and AWT (2 x AH-64)			
MEDEVAC	AME			
ISR	RC-E			
FIRES	DIRECT			

PSR(S)1

$PSR(S)^1, PSR(S)^2, PSR(S)^3$



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OP RAHBARI

OBJ BURNHAM

DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)

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EXPLOITATION

DETENTION AUTHORITY	TSE/SSE
CRU ^{PSR(S), PSR:} has detention authority (MOI Warrant for Arrest)	Recovered from the site and taken to MOI for exploitation
DETENTION	DOC/MED/COMM EXPLOITATION
ABDUL KALTA (OBJ BURNHAM) and NEMATULLAH (OBJ NOVA / PSR(S) ^{PSR(S), PSR:}) are to be detained by ^{PSR(S), PSR:} and handed to MOI for detention and prosecution CRU	Exploitation by MOI investigators
SEARCH MITIGATION	EXPLOSIVES
Women and minors will be kept in a separate area	Recovered from the site and forwarded to CEXC for exploitation
FURTHER PROCESSING AND TQ	FORENSICS
Detainees will be questioned on site for tactically valuable information by CRU personnel. Dependent on tactical situation and on the advice of APU all likely INS will be biometrically screened / enrolled.	Recovered from the site and then taken to MOI
RELEASING OF INNOCENTS	TRANSFER OF MATERIAL
Civilians will not be detained	Recovered from the site and taken to MOI
TRANSFER OF DETAINEES	EVIDENCE FOR PROSECUTION
All detainees will be recovered directly to MOI	TF81 to collate OP int/evidence in DARI REL GIROA for MOI

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DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)

OBJ BURNHAM

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IO EXPLOITATION

RELEASABLE INFORMATION	
<p><u>IO OPPORTUNITIES:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• If NEMATULLAH (OBJ NOVA / PSR(S)1) and ABDUL KALTA (OBJ BURNHAM) are captured and prosecuted by GIRoA, it would significantly reinforce the authority and capability of GIRoA and its security forces.• Name of individual only releasable following UNCLAS reflections, in which case the following should be released:<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Position the individual holds within the INS organisation.• Summary of the illegal activities the individual has been involved in (Facilitation, IEDs, Conventional Attacks).• Details of any other significant INS the individual has close association with.• Details of any weapons and munitions discovered on target. Images containing relevant content in support of narrative.	
IO OBJECTIVE	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Degrade INS C2.• Inform LNs of ISAF successes.• Discourage local population from supporting or joining INS groups.	
IO THEMES & MESSAGES	
<p><u>SUPPORTED ISAF/RC PRIORITIES:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Protect the Population from AAF• Disrupt the Taliban Network across all Lines of Operation• Secure Freedom of Movement on Major RC-N Highways	
IO TASKS	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• PA release co-ordinated through MOI.• IO partnership tasks through ISAF SOF IO.	



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DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)

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Overall Risk to Mission	HIGH	Risk of CIVCAS?		LOW
Overall Risk to Force	HIGH	Collateral Damage Estimate Completed?		YES
Overall Risk		Key Communicators in AO		Method Of Influence
HIGH	HIGH – Requires detailed Consequence Management planning and deconfliction with ISAF SOF HQ & BSO.	ANP	NA	NA
		ANA	NA	NA
		OCC-R	BAGHLAN	PSR(IC)4
		OCC-P	MAZAR-e SHARIFF	PSR(IC)4
	MEDIUM – Requires detailed Consequence Management planning at the TF level.	District	NA	NA
		Tribal	Village elder	Through KLE.
		Civilian	NIL	NIL
	LOW – Reactive Consequence Management as required.	NGO	NIL	NIL
		Religious	Village mullah	Through KLE.
		Other	NIL	
Risk Analysis		Mitigation Strategies		
Date of Last CIVCAS Incident or allegation in AO	NIL	Radio Message Prepared?	YES	BROADCAST LOCATION BAMYAN PRT
Risk of adverse LN response to Op?	HIGH			
Risk of adverse Media Coverage?	LOW	Media Release Prepared?	YES	POSTER PREPARED TO BE LEFT ON TARGET AREA
BSO pre-briefed on Op?	YES			
Does ISAF hold the ground?	NO	Combat Camera?	YES	ORGANIC
Enemy presence in the AO?	YES			
Risk of INS propaganda?	MED	Media Monitoring?	YES	THROUGH ISAF SOF IO
Is there local acceptance of ISAF forces?	NO			
Is there an effective ANSF presence?	NO	Payments Authorized?	YES	THROUGH MOI
Is there effective District political leadership?	NO			
Is there effective Provincial political leadership?	NO	Investigation Team Standby?	YES	IJC INVESTIGATION TEAM AVAIABLE THROUGH ISAF SOF LNO
Is post Op KLE available?	UNKNOWN			

Mitigation Tasks

Media Release through BSO. A BSHO will occur PSR(S)1

dated 081916Z Apr 10

LN engagement. A response will then be co-ordinated between NZPRT and BSO.

The required records will be completed in both English and Dari or Pashtu. Photographic evidence will support this documentation Should it prove tactically feasible for both LN's and GF, local leaders will be identified and a brief APU lead Shura will be conducted to mitigate perceived negative aspects of the operation

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OP RAHBARI

OBJ BURNHAM


DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)

LEVEL 2

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Deconfliction Data	
TF	TF81
Op Name Loc	OP RAHBARI OBJ BURNHAM
Ops Box	5000M RADIUS AROUND GRID 42S VD 23015 91304
Start	212000D+ AUG 10
End	220800D+ AUG 10
Point of Contact and contact info	TF81 LNO: ISAF VOIP PSR(IC)4



	Battlespace Owner
	RC-N
	IJC

Complete
Ongoing
Incomplete
Not done

Remarks/Restrictions:
Handover of Ops box on completion of Operation and a results brief to BSO. ANSF led and MOI paperwork completed by APU.
Due to isolation of tgt handover will be conducted with BSO between TOCs.